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The implementation of a new program within the Army's
Military Intelligence Branch, the enlisted Counterintel-
ligence career management field, is described. The creation
of the duty position Counterintelligence Assistant repre-
sents a major change to the field through the introduction
of an entry skill level which did not previously exist.
This change was primarily a result of a chronic shortage of
personnel which found skill level two filled at only 30 per
cent of authorized strength as of March 1981.
The implementation of this program is analyzed using an
organizational development approach, and employs the use of
a conceptual model to facilitate analysis. After a presen-
tation of the identified need for change, and the intended
processes for implementing the program, a diagnosis is
accomplished. The areas included in the diagnosis are the
recruitment and formal training phases, the role of the
Counterintelligence Assistant, job satisfaction, and the
retention potential of soldiers.
The conclusions identify actual and perceived weaknesses
in the recruitment and utilization phases of implementing
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. FOUNDATION FOR OBJECTIVES
The Army's Military Intelligence Branch has undergone
several major changes in recent years. These changes have
resulted in identification of new tasks and goals, incor-
poration of advanced technological equipment and procedures,
and restructuring of units through activation, deactivation
and consolidation. This thesis concentrates on a major
change that was recently implemented in the enlisted career
management field of Counterintelligence Agent. Specifically,
the change involves the introduction of an entry skill level
to the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 97B which was
not previously present in the career management field.
Prior to this planned change, Counterintelligence Agents
were required to have completed two years of service prior
to application for Counterintelligence training, and to
have attained the age of 21 prior to graduating from the
Counterintelligence course. These personnel normally
entered the Counterintelligence field at skill level two.
The introduction of an entry skill level resulted from
a chronic shortage of Counterintelligence personnel, pri-
marily in the junior enlisted grades. In March 1S81, the
shortage had become so severe that only 30 per cent of skill
level two positions were filled. This inadequate fill of

personnel was a direct result of insufficient recruitment
of in-service personnel. Additionally, a military study
indicated an increased need for Counterintelligence support
in tactical units, predominantly in the area of Operations
Security. It was hypothesized that Operations Security and
tactical Counterintelligence support could be accomplished
by personnel who did not have the experience or the maturity
of the existing Counterintelligence Agents. Therefore, the
Counterintelligence Assistant program was designed and imple-
mented. Although this appears to be strictly a structural
modification based on personnel shortages and a task change,
the impact on other parts of the system cannot be ignored.
The secondary and tertiary consequences of any change must
be considered to prevent unforeseen circumstances from can-
celling the primary desired effects [Ref 1: p. 9].
B. OBJECTIVES
The objectives are:
1. To determine if the needs and expectations of indi-
viduals enlisting for the MOS are being met in the
recruitment phase;
2. To identify incongruencies in formal and unit training;
3. To determine if unit commanders are utilizing the
Counterintelligence Assistants in a manner that is
consistant with the Army Regulation;
4. To identify the initial job satisfaction and potential




The data collection phase included obtaining historical
and current literature on the Counterintelligence Assistant
program from Department of the Army agencies and staffs,
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, United
States Army Forces Command and the United States Army In-
telligence Center and School. Literature research also
encompassed current organizational development applications,
and major studies previously conducted on related subjects.
Data was also collected through personal and telephonic
interviews with recruiter personnel at local recruiting
stations, a United States Armed Forces Examining and Entrance
Station, a District Recruiting Command Headquarters and the
United States Army Recruiting Command.
A questionnaire was developed specifically for Counter-
intelligence Assistants, and distributed to personnel who
were assigned to units following formal training. Develop-
ment of the questionnaire included research on preparation
of questions, interviews with Counterintelligence Assistants
to gain an insight on terminology and the processes of the
program, and collaboration with a Naval Postgraduate School
Professor who is recognized as an authority in questionnaire
development and design. Because the Counterintelligence
Assistant program is relatively new, the population cur-
rently assigned to the field is small. Therefore, the
10

entire population was included in the survey. More de-
tailed information on interview methodology and the design,
administration and feedback of the questionnaire is con-
tained in Appendix A. A copy of the questionnaire and
results are contained in Appendix B, although specific
references to portions of the data are contained in Chapters
IV and V. Respondents to the questionnaire were provided
anonymity in order to encourage frank and open responses.
Personal interviews with Counterintelligence Assistants,
their supervisors and commanders were conducted at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Hood, Texas; and Fort Ord,
California. These installations were selected because of
the high density of Counterintelligence Assistants in com-
parison to other locations. Personal interviews were also
conducted with staff and faculty members at the United
States Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca,
Arizona. Interviews were also conducted with students en-
rolled in the Counterintelligence Assistant course at Fort
Huachuca.
Personal observations were also made of Counterintel-
ligence Assistants involved with daily activities in their
units, and of classes presented to student personnel at the
United States Army Intelligence Center and School.
11

D. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Although the Counterintelligence Assistant program is
nearing maturity, there are revisions anticipated or in
progress within the Counterintelligence field. These
changes, which will have varying degrees of impact on the
program, include modification of the Counterintelligence
Assistant training and subsequent Counterintelligence
courses and the publication of the Soldier's Manual for the
entry skill level. Additionally, a review and possible
revision in doctrine is currently under study, and actions
to alter units' Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
(MTO&E) and Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) is
pending for Counterintelligence positions. When appropriate,
reference to these pending and potential changes will be
made to insure clarity of the existing situation.
It is assumed that the readers of this thesis have a
basic understanding of the Army's Military Intelligence





Chapter I has presented the need and objectives for this
study. Additionally, the methodology used in accomplishing
the research, and the limitations and assumptions, have been




Chapter II relates the applicability of the organiza-
tional development process to a change in a complex organi-
zation. A model is constructed in this chapter which
provides the basis for examining the change that has been
implemented in the Counterintelligence field from a total
systems perspective.
Chapter III provides factors and considerations that
led to a felt need for change in the existing Counter-
intelligence program. A review of the intended implementa-
tion design will be provided, concentrating on the areas of
recruitment, formal training, utilization in the field and
career progression. This chapter provides the background,
major considerations and differences which were applied in
implementing an innovative change, and facilitates diagnosis
of the actual implementation.
Chapter IV addresses the recruitment and formal training
programs as they evolved from the change process. The model
identified in Chapter II is applied as a diagnostic tool in
assessing these phases of the program, and the input from
recruiter personnel and Counterintelligence Assistants is
analyzed.
Chapter V presents the actual employment of Counter-
intelligence Assistants in the field, and identifies the
compatibility of commander's utilization with the intent of
the Army Regulation. Additionally, the views and percep-
tions of commanders, supervisors and Counterintelligence
13

Assistants concerning satisfaction with the MOS are pre-
sented, and an indication of retention potential within
the Counterintelligence field is analyzed.
Chapter VI provides a brief summary of conclusions, as
well as recommendations for interventions which will provide
direction toward improving the overall effectiveness of the




II. AN ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT APPROACH
TO PLANNED CHANGE
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a brief background of organiza-
tional development, and how it can be applied to a planned
change within a complex organization. Additionally, a con-
ceptual model consisting of six components is developed,
with a definition of each component. This model serves as
a diagnostic lens to review the implementation of the
Counterintelligence Assistant program, and is employed im-
plicitly in Chapters IV, V, and VI to present perceived
and potential problems, and provide recommendations.
B. APPLICABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Organizational development has evolved from a series of
management techniques applied throughout the twentieth cen-
tury. In 1900 Fredrick Taylor conducted work in the area
of scientific management which concentrated on productivity
and making work more efficient within an organization.
During this period, the majority of the workers were poorly
educated, accustomed to obeying orders without question,
and were deeply concerned with job security and survival
[Ref. 2: p. 10]. In the 1920's the classical management
style was dominant, and emphasized how to organize for work,
15

and focused a great deal on organizational structure. Max
Weber's legal/bureaucratic model was at the forefront during
this era, and his philosophy was that in order to dominate
a large number of people, the followers must be made to feel
obligated to obey the orders of superiors. The legal domi-
nation was the primary basis for control, and followers
obeyed because they accepted the law and the procedure
[Ref . 3: p. 76] .
Various management models were employed through the
1930s and 1940s, including the human relations management
technique which was oriented toward people, and followed
the advent of labor unions and the depression. A closely
related concept, which was a result of the human relations
management theory, was the concept of participative manage-
ment. This management theory subscribed that personnel in
an organization must be committed to and supportive of the
organizational goals.
The functional management model was also popular in this
time period, and concentrated on the processes involved with
work. The basic premise of the functional management tech-
nique was that work can be separated into distinct functions
within an organization. Once these functions had been iden-
tified, groups were formed which performed similar tasks.
During World War II, the management science models appeared,
and were centered primarily on the analytical methods.
16

Management science was technically oriented and included
such methods as Program Evaluation and Review Techniques
(PERT) . In the 1950s the social technical systems of
management came to the forefront and considered not only the
analytical aspects, but also included the behavior science
implications in applying management techniques. It is from
this area that organizational development had its inception.
Organizational development has expanded vastly in the
last thirty years. This has predominantly been a result of
the accelerated changes occurring in technology, communica-
tions, politics, social values and institutional dimensions
of our society. People are more educated, and less con-
cerned with job security and survival. Major changes in
social values have also resulted in personnel who are more
likely to challenge or question rules and policies rather
than blindly obey them. An organization can no longer cling
to the prior mechanism of economic contracting for re-
cruiting, motivating or retaining workers. Duty positions
that do not provide a challenge, or organizations that
poorly communicate goals and objectives, may fail to gain a
worker's commitment, resulting in personnel investing less
of themselves in their jobs and the organization [Ref. 4:
p. 3] . Using a systems approach, organizational development
has grown in response to a need from organizations for sur-
vival and viability in a rapidly changing world. This
17

systems approach examines the facets of an organization that
were previously looked upon as separate entities, and views
these same parts on the premise that there are relationships
between them. In the past, managers in civilian or military
organizations may have been able to look solely at the re-
lationships between task and structure with success. How-
ever, today's managers must view a change in any part of
the organization with a concern as to how it will affect all
other parts.
Large corporations and the military services have recog-
nized the applicability of organizational development, and
have devoted extensive resources to furthering their pro-
grams. Organizational development can therefore be applied
not only in smaller organizations, which may have an organic
structure, but can and is being applied in large, complex,
bureaucratic organizations, such as the military, which are
predominantly mechanistic.
Organizational development is an effort which involves
a planned change that is organization-wide and managed from
the top. The purpose of the change is to increase the or-
ganization's effectiveness through planned interventions in
the organization's processes, using the knowledge of be-
havioral science [Ref. 5: p. 9]. An organizational change
process may vary in size and complexity as well as time from
onset to completion. Normally, in a large bureaucratic
13

organization, a change evolves over a period of several
years, and experiences a settling-in period when the change
is modified to gain congruence within the organization.
Organizational development also has as a major theme that a
change undertaken is not only congruent with all components
of the organization, but also receives the commitment of the
personnel in the organization. One process that is critical
to gaining this commitment is that of communication.
In a bureaucracy, communication is based primarily on a
vertical top-down process. However, informal lateral and
bottom-up networks can exist. Accurately relaying the in-
tended goals, objectives and processes involved in a change
can greatly facilitate commitment building by linking the
top management with the eventual users or implementers of
the change. If commitment is not obtained, resistance to
change may occur. All organizations have a natural tendency
to resist change to some degree, and coping with this in-
stinctive behavior is extremely difficult. Two specific
types of resistance may be experienced in an organization:
individual or personal resistance and organizational forms
of resistance. Organizational resistance is considered to
be the most prevalent in a bureaucratic organization [Ref. 6
pp. 31-55]
.
A change in a complex organization generally will con-
tain several elements to include:
19

1. Diagnosing the present situation, including the need
for change;
2. Setting goals and defining the desired state after the
change
;
3. Defining the transition state between the present and
future
4. Developing strategies and action plans for managing
the transition;
5. Evaluating the change effort;
6. Stabilizing the new condition and obtaining a balance
between stability and flexibility [Ref. 7: p. 16].
A planned change, such as the implementation of the
Counterintelligence Assistant program, normally comprises a
one-time structural and functional modification which has
defined boundaries for achieving the steady state. Addi-
tionally, two conditions must be met before a change can be
effectively managed. First, the leadership of the organi-
zation must be aware of the need for change, and secondly,
the desired end state must be clear. Furthermore, analysis
of the organization's subsystems is an implicit considera-
tion which should be included to insure that the total or-
ganization is ready for the planned change.
As with any change effort, there is a cost involved.
Therefore, the total investment will have to be compared to
the organization's capability to accept the change. A
change will occur only when the costs are outweighed by a
number of factors which can create a positive motivation
toward the change. David Gleicher developed a change
20

formula which expresses the factors associated with the cost
of change:
C = (ABD) > X
where C is the change, A is the level of dissatisfaction
with the current situation, B is the clear desired end
state, D is the practical first step toward the desired
state, and X is the cost of the change. The premise of this
formula is that if sufficient dissatisfaction with the status
quo does not exist, and the subsystems involved in the
planned change are not informed of and provided clear goals
concerning the change, the cost will be too high to affect
the change successfully [Ref 1: pp. 25-26 and Ref. 4:
p. 46]. Additionally, each subsystem needs some degree of
awareness of the methods to be employed in attaining the
first steps toward the desired state. If this is not ac-
complished, little, if any, movement may occur, and the
change may reach an early demise. The process of communi-
cation is an integral part of determining the degree of
dissatisfaction with the status quo, insuring that the sub-
systems are informed of the goals and providing information
on the first steps involved in reaching the desired state.
This communication serves as a link in gaining commitment
and obtaining feedback on the problems associated with the
change and any modifications that may be needed.
21

C. A CONCEPTUAL MODEL
The total systems approach of organizational development
is enhanced by using a diagnostic tool when viewing complex
organizations. The use of such a diagnostic aid facilitates
a systematic process of defining problems, developing pri-
mary and alternate solutions, and implementing and evaluating
change. A model provides the mechanism for accomplishing
these actions, and lends order to the analysis. There are
several models available with which organizations can be
viewed. However, one model that has been consistently used
by the researcher, and has wide acceptance in organizational
development, is the Leavitt diamond [Ref. 1: p. 9 and Ref.
8: p. 56]. Figure 1 provides a modified version of the
Leavitt diamond, which was used in collecting and analyzing
data on the Counterintelligence Assistant program. The com-
ponents contained in the model include: environment, struc-
ture, technology, people, tasks/goals, and communication.
Because of its interrelationship with a planned change,
communications was added to the core of the Leavitt diamond.
The environment refers to the forces that are external
to the organization, and often have a powerful influence on
the direction taken by an organization. No organization is
immune to its environment, and the military is no exception.
Outside agencies and individuals provide opportunities and
impose constraints which impact on the military, and thus





A modified Leavitt Diamond showing how organizations should






attitudes of society have made dynamic changes in recent
years, and have a direct' bearing on the way the public views
the military. The environment also has a major and lasting
effect on resources made available to the military in terms
of political processes and, perhaps the most critical re-
source of any organization, the human resources that become
part of the organization. With the termination of the draft,
the military was faced with having the authority to recruit
personnel for the service, but more than ever the social
values and attitudes of people entering the service had to
be taken into consideration. Failure to take these factors
into consideration would have soon found the military with
the inability to recruit or retain personnel. As previously
cited, the bureaucratic organization can no longer rely on
purely economic motives for personnel joining or remaining
with an organization.
Structure refers to those elements that describe an or-
ganization's relationships between its subunits. These are
systems which have been designed to regulate the actions of
an organization, and represent the organizational rather
than individual characteristics. Elements included in
structure are the number of levels of hierarchy, organiza-
tion size, job structure, centralized or decentralized
management, staff relations and evaluation systems. The
structure of an organization provides the composition of
the organization, describing how it will be organized for
24

work, denoting how and by whom the work will be accomplished,
and defining the chain of responsibility.
Technology is the component that not only implies highly
sophisticated equipment such as word processors and com-
puters, but includes those methodologies made available to
and employed by an organization to accomplish tasks. Thus,
technology refers to the ways in which an organization
solves problems, either with highly technical equipment and
systems design, or through individual and group expertise
and innovation. The impact of technology is not confined to
large corporations, but has also resulted in the military
modifying its traditional managerial systems in order to
adapt to changes. And as a result, the military, like many
other large and complex organizations, has become more de-
pendent upon the knowledge and skills of specialists [Ref. 9:
p. 475] .
The tasks and goals component of the model have been
combined, although they are separate and distinct entities.
Tasks are normally considered as specific assignments of
work given to an individual or unit by another organiza-
tional subunit. Tasks can either be formal, with struc-
tured conditions and standards such as those required in a
soldier's Skill Qualification Test (SQT) , or informal tasks
which are implied or presented verbally. Normally, multiple
tasks are presented in the form of job descriptions for
soldiers. However, some of the tasks, notably those with
25

implied functions, often require basic skills which must be
mastered prior to the accomplishment of the more complex
tasks
.
The goals applied to this model refer to organizational
rather than individual goals. Goals are usually formally
and explicitly expressed, and describe a desired state of an
organization at a future point in time. The goals of an
organization can be realized by accomplishing a front-end
assessment to determine those actions and intermediate steps
which must be completed to reach the desired end state.
These intermediate steps are objectives which provide direc-
tion and allow the ultimate goal to be reached.
People are the basic resource of any organization. With-
out reservation, one of the most significant elements in
organizational development theory is that which deals with
the behavior and attitudes of the personnel working in the
organization. Although the human resources are the most
basic, they are extremely complex. And when people join
an organization and are formed into groups, their complexity
increases. In the early 1900s, people's needs were very
basic and centered on physiological and safety needs. In
today's world, individuals are able to focus on higher
level needs such as achievement, recognition and self-
actualization. Managers must be aware of these changing
wants by personnel, to insure the organizational goals are
achieved. Elements of this component include, but are not
26

limited to, personal needs, expectations, abilities, atti-
tudes, morale, motivation, job satisfaction, training pro-
grams and reward systems. Unless managers take these and
other variables into consideration, the overall accomplish-
ment of an organization's mission may be adversely affected.
The component that has been added to the core of the
diamond is communication. This element serves as the cen-
tral thread which ties the model together. All organiza-
tions have an established communication system for transfer
of information. Historical records and literature are
abundant with examples of effective and ineffective communi-
cation networks. The importance of communication to an
organization cannot be overemphasized. The vertical chain
is the primary organization system in military organiza-
tions. A breakdown in this system at any level will usually
result in problems in one or all of the components.
D . SUMMARY
Organizational development has applications in the ci-
vilian and military sectors which have clearly gained rapid
acceptance. The use of a model, such as the one presented
in this chapter, serves as a valuable diagnostic aid in
viewing the entire system for effects, even though the




III. THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSISTANT PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides the background information neces-
sary for beginning the diagnosis of the implementation of
the Counterintelligence (CI) Assistant program, employing
the conceptual model developed in Chapter II. The need for
CI Assistants, and the initiation and intended implementa-
tion of the 97B10 program, will be presented, with a review
of the recruiting, formal training, use in the field, and
career progression of CI Assistants.
B. A NEED FOR CHANGE
In 1973 there were 883 CI Agents in the grades of E5 and
E6 on active duty. With the end of the Vietnam conflict,
and the subsequent termination of the draft, the number of
CI Agents authorized on active duty was reduced and one
means of obtaining CI Agents was ended. During the draft
years, some CI Agents were obtained by screening drafted
personnel who met the qualifications for the career field.
In 1976 another potential source of CI Agents, the Military
Intelligence Coordinator (97D) MOS , was terminated. These
personnel served in administrative capacities within Mili-
tary Intelligence (MI) organizations, and frequently trans-
ferred into the 97B MOS. From 1976 to the advent of the CI
28

Assistant program, the primary means of recruiting personnel
into the CI Agent field was through the in-service recruit-
ment program.
The in-service recruitment program is not formally
structured, and no Major Command (MACOM) is tasked with
overall responsibility for the program [Ref. 10]. Addi-
tionally, the program is not designed as an active recruit-
ment process, but rather a passive approach consisting
primarily of providing information on the 97B MOS , and
providing assistance in completing an application packet.
Recruitment of in-service personnel is not a primary func-
tion of an intelligence organization, but constitutes an
additional responsibility. The means of providing informa-
tion to prospective applicants varies, but includes notices
in bulletins, word-of-mouth, briefings at installation
level, notices to personnel in over-strength MOSs from their
servicing Military Personnel Center Branch, and other means.
Recruitment of in-service personnel normally occurs at or
near the end of the first enlistment, and requires an ex-
tensive process involving an interview and recommendation by
a CI Agent, completion of a biographic essay, and other ad-
ministrative requirements. The completed packet is then
forwarded and a formal board adjudicates each application.
Those favorably considered may then attend the 97B20 CI
Agent course at the United States Army Intelligence Center
and School (USAICS) . Personnel recruited are required to
29

meet the requirement of two years of active duty service
and attain the age of 21 years prior to completing the
course. Additionally, these personnel normally must re-
enlist for 97B in order to meet the requirement of suffi-
cient time in-service remaining after completion of the CI
Agent course. The average approval rate for applicants for
fiscal years 1978 through 1980 was 54.4 per cent.
The relatively low approval rate of in-service recruits,
when combined with the deletion of the 97D MOS and the ter-
mination of the draft, caused a shortfall in CI personnel,
and resulted in units operating well below their 97B au-
thorizations for an extended period. Prior to 1980, the
Active Army was operating at approximately 77 per cent of
authorized strength in the 97B MOS. Figure 2 depicts the
declining strength of 97B personnel in the normal entry
level (E5) from 1972 to 1980. In March of 1981, 43 97B
personnel in the grade of E5 were on active duty. The total
authorization for this grade was 143, putting the grade at
30 per cent of authorized fill. The grade of E6 was at 65
per cent fill, and the grade of E7 was at 68 per cent fill.
Prior to 1975, most of the CI tasks and duties centered
around what has been termed the more traditional CI acti-
vities. However, an Intelligence Organization and Stationing
Study (IOSS) identified more tactically oriented CI duties,
primarily in the area of Operations Security (OPSEC) sup-
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units, with increased CI support to tactical units, both in
garrison and in the field. This increased emphasis and the
requirements for support in the area of OPSEC highlighted
the manpower constraints in CI positions, particularly in
tactical MI units.
As a concerted effort to improve the OPSEC posture of
tactical units, the United States Army Forces Command
(FORSCOM) submitted a proposal in September 1978 to elimi-
nate the requirements of 21 years of age and two years
prior service before an individual could enter the CI field.
These recommendations were based on the manpower shortages,
and the premise that the nature of OPSEC support does not
require the same degree of maturity, experience or the in-
vestigative skill needed in a CI Agent. It was further
recommended that an entry level skill of MOS 97B10 be estab-
lished, with a program of instruction (POI) modified to
train more in OPSEC techniques, with omission of investi-
gative methods and special operations training. These
Tactical OPSEC or CI Specialists, as they were first named,
would be assigned to tactical MI units. After two years,
they would return for training in the more traditional non-
tactical CI skills. It was recognized that the potential
effectiveness of an E3 or E4 OPSEC advisor dealing with a
supported unit commander or his staff might be hampered, due
to a lack of Army experience. Therefore, the CI Specialist
would be paired with a senior CI noncommissioned officer.
32

As a member of a CI team, it was felt the disadvantage could
be minimized. The proposal also included changes in unit
structure which would allow approximately 20 per cent of the
tactical 97B positions to be redesignated as 97B10 positions
[Ref. 12].
This proposal was the first step in bringing about the
CI Assistant program, and would result in a major change
within the complex organization of the United States Army.
The proposal would undergo some modifications, but the cen-
tral theme would remain as the nucleus of the program.
C. IMPLEMENTATION DESIGN
The proposal submitted by FORSCOM was favorably con-
sidered, and in March 1979 the United States Army Military
Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) staffed a proposal to the
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
,
the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command
(INSCOM) and FORSCOM that closely paralleled the initial
recommendation by FORSCOM [Ref. 13]. Prior to this, several
other offices and agencies had been involved with coordina-
tion of the proposed action, and a study was completed by
the United States Soldier Support Center to determine the
feasibility of restructuring the MOS 97B. This study con-
curred that the two major considerations which contributed
to the manpower decline in the 97B MOS were the age require-
ment and the prior service requirement, and further agreed
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that a means of obtaining personnel other than in-service
recruitment was needed. At the completion of the study,
meetings were conducted with representatives from MILPERCEN,
Professional Development, and the Office of the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence (who favored the restruc-
turing action prior to the study) to determine the job
description and map the career pattern of 97B10s.
In May 1980, a letter of notification was distributed to
the field by MILPERCEN. This letter announced the forth-
coming revision to the MOS 97B, and stated that guidance
would be published in Change 15 to Army Regulation (AR) 611-
201 (Enlisted Career Management Fields and Military Occu-
pational Specialties), effective 1 March 1981. The letter,
provided for planning purposes only, also included major
features of the change and examples of MTOE revisions [Ref.
14].
1 . Recruitment
The authorization to begin recruitment was effected
in May 1979, under the delayed entry program. The first
year's authorization was 459 personnel. The information on
the 97B MOS was to be distributed through normal distribution
channels. Because it was a new MOS skill level, and the
first attempt at recruiting personnel off-the-street , a job
description for 97B10 was published in the ACSIGRAM, with
copies of this article to be forwarded to INSCOM, the United
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States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) and USAICS for publi-
cation in their respective command journals and magazines.
The procedure which took an individual from civilian
status through enlistment and ultimately to the 97B10 MOS
would usually be initiated with a station recruiter whose
primary function would be to "sell" the Army, but not a
specific MOS. After completing the administrative require-
ments for an enlistment packet at the recruiting station,
the individual would discuss potential MOS positions with a
guidance counselor at the Armed Forces Entrance and Examining
Station (AFEES) . Once MOSs that are open and for which the
individual qualifies are identified, the guidance counselor
would assist the individual in selecting a MOS. After the
job descriptions and options in the MOSs have been provided
to the individual, a selection would be made and an enlist-
ment contract prepared. The contract, signed by the en-
listee, would include such items as the number of years of
service incurred, the MOS and course of instruction for
which the individual has enlisted, and any constraints which
might prevent the individual from being awarded the MOS,
such as failure to meet the requirements for access to Sen-
sitive Compartmented Information (SCI) . Upon completion of
the enlistment process, the soldier would then attend Basic
Combat Training (BCT) . Initial security screening would be
accomplished at the AFEES, and bioscreening, by CI Agents
from the 902d MI Group, would be accomplished at BCT. The
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902d personnel would interview soldiers to determine their
suitability for the MOS 97B, and obtain biographic essays.
Soldiers would be permitted to enter the training at USAICS
based on a favorable National Agency Check (NAC) , and fa-
vorable adjudication of the bioscreening by the Central
Clearance Facility (CCF) . Additionally, personnel would
need to meet the requirements for access to SCI prior to
being accepted into the 97B MOS.
2 . Formal Training
After completion of BCT and the security clearance
requirements, soldiers would enter the 97B10 Course. Ini-
tially, the length of this course was estimated at six to
eight weeks, with the first course to be offered in July
1980. The course length was later adjusted to eleven weeks,
with the first class scheduled to begin in March 1981, fol-
lowing a front-end analysis by USAICS [Ref. 15]. This
analysis was to review the tasks a CI Assistant would be
required to accomplish in a tactical unit, and facilitate
structuring the course to meet the soldier's and unit's
needs
.
The 97B10 course was to concentrate on those tasks
required for tactical CI and OPSEC support. Subject matter
that involved investigative duties and special operations
would be omitted, since the 97B10s would not meet the age
requirement for investigative duties [Ref. 16]. Addition-
ally, CI Assistants would not be issued badges and credentials
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until they had completed the 97B20 course. The possible
misutilization of 97B10s in an investigative role was of
concern to USAICS , and correspondence was submitted through
TRADOC to MILPERCEN indicating that the job description
should be stated so as to prevent possible misinterpreta-
tion. Also, the initial job description closely paralled
the 97D MOS , and concern was expressed that clarification
was needed to prevent the erroneous belief that the 97B10
was a rebirth of the 97D MOS [Ref. 17]. These adjustments
were applied to the job description published in Change 15
to AR 611-201.
The 97B10 course was to consist of 424 hours, 330
hours dedicated to academic subjects to be taught during
the eleven week course. The majority of the instruction
would cover CI related tasks such as personnel, physical
and document security, inspections, surveys, OPSEC, real
world threat, and preparation of supporting documents and
plans. Since the 97Bl0s were off-the-street recruits, in-
struction in supporting skills was also programmed. Sub-
jects to be included in this area were weather and terrain
analysis, intelligence preparation of the battlefield,
United States Army structure and doctrine, tactical communi-
cations, and other topics which would enable the soldiers to
more effectively accomplish CI tasks.
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3. Utilization in the Field
Once the formal training at USAICS was completed,
the 97B10s would be assigned to tactical units in the United
States and overseas commands. The initial assignment would
be made by the Advanced Individual Training (AIT) branch,
with subsequent assignments being made by MI Branch. Indi-
viduals who were 18 years of age, and thus would have a
three-year probation period, would be primary candidates for
an overseas assignment. Individuals who were 20 or older
would be considered for state-side assignments as their
first tour.
Since upon graduation of the first classes of CI
Assistants, 97B10 positions would not yet exist in unit MTOE
or TDA documents, assignments to tactical units would be
based on authorized 97B20 positions. Department of the Army
Circular 611-82 (Personnel Selection and Classification,
Implementation of Change 15 to AR 611-201) contained guid-
ance on regrading organizations to conform to the revised
addition of an entry level. These changes were to be sub-
mitted through the Vertical Army Authorization Document
System (VTAADS) during the period 1 through 23 March 1981
[Ref. 18]. Once this input had been incorporated into
existing documents, assignments of 97B10 personnel would be
made on a position authorized basis.
The CI Assistants would work with more experienced
CI Agents in an apprentice role. The primary function of
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the 97B10 would be to assist and participate in tactical
non-investigative CI and OPSEC duties. These would include
assisting in determining enemy intelligence collection as-
sets, organization, composition, personnel, methods of
operation, capabilities, vulnerabilities, limitations and
missions. Additional operations in which the 97B10 would
provide assistance included evaluating sources of informa-
tion, typing reports and summaries, preparing interrogation
rooms, disseminating intelligence reports, and storing,
inventorying and controlling classified documents [Ref. 19].
It was recognized that a 97B10 would be lacking in
experience and knowledge of tactical unit functions , and the
support required, and therefore would operate most effec-
tively as a member of a team in providing OPSEC and other
tactical CI services. The senior member of a team would be
a more experienced CI Agent who could supervise the CI
Assistant and provide the necessary guidance and instruction
to enhance the learning process. Additionally, units would
have the inherent mission of providing the training in
common soldier skills and MOS related tasks which would
further the education of the CI Assistants, and insure that
they were fully qualified in their specialty.
After the probation period, the unit commander would
complete a letter either recommending that the individual be
accredited as a CI Agent based on demonstrated performance
and potential, or that the 97B10 not be favorably considered
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for retention in the MOS. If favorable consideration was
made, the individual would return to USAICS for 20 level
training.
4 . Career Progression
The implementation of the 97B10 MOS was consistant
with the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS) , and
brought the MOS 97B in focus with the stated objective of
EPMS by providing a realistic, clear and viable career pro-
gression path in the MOS from entry level to sergeant major.
Upon completing the 20 level training at USAICS, the
next assignment would preferably be a strategic assignment
with INSCOM. However, the possibility of receiving another
tactical assignment would exist, dependent upon the needs of
the Army. The desired assignment schedule would find per-
sonnel alternating between tactical and strategic positions.
Once a soldier reached the 97B20 level, he could continue in
the 97B field or, if qualified and favorably considered,
could enter the Area Intelligence (97C) field. Figure 3
provides the normal career progression and training asso-
ciated with the 97B MOS.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided information on how the CI
Assistant program was initiated and intended for implementa-
tion, based on a felt need for change. The phases of the
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recruitment, formal training and utilization in the field.
Additionally, the career progression an individual in the
97B MOS could expect was also provided. This information
will be referred to in Chapters IV and V, as a diagnosis of
the change process is accomplished.
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IV. THE ACTIVATION OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter begins the diagnosis of the change pro-
cesses which occurred as the CI Assistant program evolved.
The recruitment, screening process, and formal training
phases are reviewed with the aid of the conceptual model de-
veloped in Chapter II. This model is a diagnostic tool, and
is implicitly employed in identifying strengths and weak-
nesses associated with the implementation of the 97B10 pro-
gram. The researcher has opted to view the program changes
in chronological sequence rather than by grouping the data
according to the components contained in the model. This
methodology will permit separation of the change implementa-
tions into distinct phases, and prevent cross-referencing
component items at the conclusion of the analysis. Since
the diagnostic phase emphasizes processes, the focus will
be on issues associated with the program rather than speci-
fic references to offices, agencies and units.
B. RECRUITMENT
The formal activation phase of the CI Assistant program
was the authorization to begin recruiting personnel for the
97B10 MOS in May 1979. It is normal for station recruiters
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to have the first contact with potential enlistees, followed
by guidance counselors at AFEES . Regrettably, this is where
the first weakness in the change process was identified.
The components of the model which were identified as con-
cerns in this phase included communication of MOS job infor-
mation, the people who were affected by the lack of correct
information, and the lack of a technological adjustment in
the screening process. Unfortunately, the impact of the
recruitment phase carried over into other aspects of the
program, and may have medium range implications which could
carry through the military cycle, eventually returning to
the recruiting phase. USAREC consists of five Recruiting
Regions which include the United States, its territories and
possessions, and selected areas in overseas locations, e.g.,
Germany. These regions are further subdivided into dis-
tricts, areas, and recruiting commands, with AFEES located
throughout the five regions. Currently, in excess of 2,500
recruiting facilities exist, and although the organizational
chain of command for USAREC is well defined and straight-
forward, the geographic area and number of offices is
enormous
.
Recruiter personnel are selected from all career manage-
ment fields, and although they are experienced in the Army
and have been well trained for their duties, they do not
usually have in-depth knowledge of each Army MOS. Therefore,
the receipt of correct information regarding the initial
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recruiting effort in any career field is of paramount im-
portance. Without this information, potential enlistees
cannot be provided accurate data concerning the qualifica-
tions for the MOS , the job description, or the formal
training to be received. USAREC personnel did not have an
accurate or detailed job description for the 97B10 MOS
until April 1981.
The initial information provided to USAREC contained
only the correct requirements for entry to the MOS. There-
fore, many of the soldiers who enlisted for 97B10 were pro-
vided with an inaccurate job description. Subsequent
contracts for these personnel indicated 97B10 as the MOS
for which they had enlisted, but the duty title and training
to be received frequently indicated CI Agent and the 97B20
course of instruction respectively.
An interview with a station recruiter from the Western
Region in May 1981 indicated the program was still unclear,
and that a problem in disseminating the revised job descrip-
tion within recruiting channels might exist. The station
recruiter from the Midwestern Region who was interviewed
telephonically in July 1981 stated that he was aware of the
recruitment effort in the 97B MOS, and had a copy of Change
15 to AR 611-201. However, when asked to explain any dif-
ferences between a 97B10 and a 97B20, the response centered
only on time in service.
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In conducting research for preparing the questionnaire,
two 97B10s were interviewed to gain an understanding of the
recruitment process. As stated previously in Chapter III,
the primary mission of a station recruiter is not to enlist
an individual for a specific MOS, but to convince him to
join the Army. However, one individual stated that he
first heard of the MOS from the local recruiter, and both
indicated a problem with the information provided by re-
cruiting personnel and with their enlistment contracts. In
interviewing soldiers and analyzing questionnaire data, it
was revealed that 26.3 per cent of the soldiers obtained
initial information on the MOS from their local recruiter.
Futhermore, it was indicated that whether the information
was obtained from station recruiters or guidance counselors
at AFEES, 93 per cent received information that was only
partially accurate, or that was completely inaccurate. All
regions were cited as having provided inaccurate data.
An interview with two AFEES guidance counselors from the
Midwestern Region was conducted in July 1981. Documentation
concerning the MOS that was readily available at the AFEES
included Change 15 to AR 611-201, and a computer printout
containing MOS requirements, duty title and length of course
for formal training. The MOS requirements were correct and
indicated 97B10. However, the duty title was CI Agent and
the course of instruction to be attended was listed as 18
weeks. This is the course length associated with the CI
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Agent course. During the course of the interview, the
counselors revealed that they were unfamiliar with the 97B
MOS , and were uncertain of the similarities and differences
between a 97B10 and a 97B20.
The guidance counselors and station recruiters displayed
a genuine concern for their lack of knowledge of the 97B10
MOS, and indicated they would willingly advise a potential
enlistee of their limitations when presenting the MOS data.
This attitude reflects a healthy command atmosphere, and
when interviewing soldiers and analyzing questionnaire data
it was readily apparent that this attitude dominates. Only
nine per cent of the respondents to the questionnaire felt
that the data presented by recruiter personnel was not the
best information available at the time they enlisted.
The initial detection of the error in and subsequent
correction of the MOS job description required a considera-
ble length of time. During this period, approximately 340
personnel entered the Army with information which was in-
correct. This resulted in soldiers' expectations of the 97B
MOS to be altered significantly when the discovery was made.
Although the recruiting phase is now nearing the steady
state, the impact of the recruitment phase may continue to
have an adverse effect on the CI Assistant program for an





The screening of recruits which was included in the ini-
tial design of the change process was accomplished from May
1971 through November 1980, and then terminated, although
the requirement for personnel to be clearable for access to
SCI continues. During the time frame from September 1979 to
September 1980, 229 personnel were considered for the 97B10
MOS. The total number approved for entry into MOS 97B10 was
117 (51.1 per cent). This relatively low approval rate was
a direct result of applying the stringent acceptance stand-
ards for the 97B20 MOS to applicants for the 97B10 MOS.
Although the technological expertise necessary to develop an
effective CI Assistant screening process was available, the
adjustment was not made. The immediate impact of discon-
tinuing the screening process was an increase in the number
of soldiers arriving at USAICS. The long term implications
are much more difficult to ascertain, and will require fur-
ther research. In discussing the termination of the screen-
ing process with staff and faculty members at USAICS, unit
supervisors and commanders, opinions varied. Some felt the
impact would be minimal, and other mechanisms, e.g., proba-
tion letters, could be employed to prevent soldiers who were
not fully qualified from progressing in the 97B MOS. Others
considered the elimination of screening to be a drastic
measure, one that will lead to degradation of the 97B field.
Further experience with soldiers who were not screened for
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entry into the MOS will be required before a rational deci-
sion can be made.
D. FORMAL TRAINING
One organization which has dealt with these weaknesses
from November 1980 to the publication of this document is
USAICS. The information weakness identified in the recruit-
ment phase carried over into the formal training of CI
Assistants. A direct result of problems in the recruitment
phase was the large number of incorrect enlistment contracts,
with a corresponding change in soldier expectations when the
inconsistencies were discovered at USAICS. This phase will
deal with these interrelated problems, as well as the tasks
USAICS was given in preparing a POI for the CI Assistant
program.
1 . Initial Military Occupational Specialty Training
The intended design of the change process would find
soldiers completing BCT and arriving at USAICS for the 97B10
course beginning in March 1981. However, due to the inac-
curacies of the job description and course of instruction
to be attended, major problems surfaced. Soldiers began
arriving at USAICS to attend the CI Assistant course in No-
vember 1980. It was at this time that discoveries were made
concerning the enlistment contract problems. This was nor-
mally the first indication for soldiers that the training
and duty position they had been told they would receive
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would not be realized. This had a traumatic impact on sol-
diers' morale and attitude toward the military, and placed a
tremendous and unanticipated burden on the personnel in
USAICS. Those who had been told they would be attending a
97B20 course with a possible civilian clothes assignment
following their training were now being informed they would
attend a CI Assistant course, and be assigned to a tactical
unit. This represented a significant change in their ini-
tial expectations, and for some it meant that the level of
training and the duty position they had selected would not
be possible unless they reenlisted. In interviewing sol-
diers who were currently enrolled in a 97B10 course and
would graduate in October 1981, 91.6 per cent indicated the
information they had received from recruiter personnel, and
their subsequent contract, was incorrect. This issue was
of primary concern to the students , and they were extremely
emotional and vocal in their responses. Clearly, they felt
their needs and expectations had not been fulfilled, and
they had been misled. Soldiers interviewed in units and
analysis of the questionnaire data revealed 89.5 per cent of
the enlistment contracts were incorrect, with 64 per cent
indicating they were informed they could be assigned to a
civilian clothes or other non-tactical assignment. Person-
nel assigned to units were less concerned over the recruit-
ment phase than students at USAICS. This is perhaps a
natural phenomenon, since the students have a more recent
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experience with the issue, and actions are in progress at
USAICS to resolve the situation, thus keeping the subject to
the forefront. Soldiers in the field consider the issue as
history, and are more oriented toward future opportunities
in the MOS
.
Since 97Bl0s arrived four months prior to the start
of the first CI Assistant course, two actions were imple-
mented to compensate for this event. It was determined that
the first arrivals would be allowed to attend the 97B20
course, and if they failed they would be recycled to a 97B10
course without adverse action. Additionally, the first
97B10 course date was changed from March to January 1981.
This latter decision required the CI Assistant course front-
end analysis to be curtailed, and an intensive effort to
complete the POI by the end of December 1980. The staff and
faculty completed the POI, which centered on tactical CI and
OPSEC. However, concern was expressed by some faculty mem-
bers interviewed that the areas covered would meet the needs
of units. This is an intuitive question, and is a logical
consideration when implementing an entry level MOS for the
first time. Although the intended design of the CI Assist-
ant POI was closely related to the CI Agent course, minus
investigations and special operations, field experience with
the program was nonexistent. Furthermore, OPSEC was a rela-
tively newly designed program combining many of the actions
tactical units had formerly accomplished as separate
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entities. The OPSEC programs which had been developed in
recent years were in keeping with the spirit and intent of
the OPSEC effort; programs were tailored to each unit, and
were accomplished using various methodologies. Implementa-
tion of the CI Assistant program did not present a new
technology, but it did represent a modification that had not
been previously attempted, and consequently a base of knowl-
edge concerning the actual employment of CI Assistants did
not exist. Combined with the varied approaches used by
units in accomplishing OPSEC, the exact training CI Assis-
tants should receive was an area that would require further
consideration. This uncertainty of which tasks would be
accomplished in the field was passed from the faculty mem-
bers to the students. Fifty-six per cent of the respondents
to the questionnaire relayed that personnel at USAICS were
not fully aware of the tasks that would be performed in the
field, an opinion which also surfaced during soldier
interviews
.
The first group of CI Assistants to attend the 97320
course experienced difficulties in successfully completing
the course, primarily in the area of Personnel Security
Investigations (PSI) . The attrition rate was approximately
40 per cent. Additional difficulties were encountered,
based primarily on the students' varying Army experience
levels. The 97B20 course consisted of instruction oriented
toward the in-service recruit for 97B. The use of acronyms
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and terms normally considered common knowledge were foreign
to the 97B10s. Although some failed the 97B20 course, a few
97Bl0s currently in the field did complete the Agent course.
Those who did not complete the course were recycled into a
97B10 class.
During the initial phase of training, 97B10 contract
disputes continued, with 96 students attempting to renego-
tiate their contract. Twenty-nine opted for unfulfilled
contracts, with the remainder choosing 97B10 training. Ad-
judication of the requests for unfulfilled contracts resulted
in five cases being considered eligible for filing unful-
filled contracts. The remainder were not considered valid
cases, because the following statement was contained in their
enlistment contract:
I understand that I will be on probation status until I
am 21 years of age or one year after successful comple-
tion of MOS 97B training, whichever is longer. [Ref. 20]
Furthermore, it was determined that soldiers who came on
active duty prior to 15 February 1981 would be offered 97B20
training, since when they enlisted this was the only course
available [Ref. 20], Approximately 17 personnel selected
the 97B20 training, but again the failure rate was extremely
high. Respondents to the questionnaire indicated that 19.3
per cent attempted to file for unfulfilled contracts or be
reclassified into another MOS. Eventually, these personnel
joined the majority of the students in signing a waiver to
their enlistment contract, and completed the 97B10 course.
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This action continued through July 1981, and although stu-
dents are now arriving with correct contracts, it does
represent a significant event in the implementation phase
of the program.
The content for the 97B10 course followed the imple-
mentation design, and has been effective in preparing sol-
diers for tactical CI and OPSEC duties. According to
questionnaire responses 66 per cent indicated the training
they received prepared them satisfactorily or marginally
satisfactorily for duty in their units. The overwhelming
response from interviews and questionnaire responses was
that the task they were best trained in was centered on
tactical CI or OPSEC, with 84.2 per cent indicating these
areas. Additionally, the majority of the soldiers relayed
that the quality of instruction by USAICS was excellent to
good. This, combined with the high number of responses in
the area best trained in, indicates that USAICS has been
very effective in providing high quality and pertinent
instruction.
Currently, proposals are pending which may have an
impact on the future training CI Assistants will receive.
One action which is under consideration is to eliminate se-
lected CI inspections, and make them a function of the unit
Security Managers, except in cases such as higher command or
Inspector General (IG) inspections. Additional considera-
tions which may have an effect on CI tasks and functions are
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the reinstitution of selected training functions for other
units which were previously accomplished by supporting CI
units. Additionally, a review is currently being con-
ducted at the DA level, with closer integration of tactical
CI and OPSEC doctrine the goal. These proposals and actions
may require modification to the current 97B10 POI , dependent
upon the exact changes implemented. The continual growth of
the 97B10 population and experience level will facilitate
USAICS efforts in identifying the specific tasks performed
in the field, and assist in accomplishing any required modi-
fications to the POI
.
This section does not present the training received
by the 97B10s in terms of tasks performed in units. This
topic is reserved for Chapter V, and will include recom-
mendations for possible changes to the POI, as made by
supervisors and commanders. The diagnosis of the initial
training in 97B10 skills was presented to depict the prob-
lems USAICS was confronted with in terms of the continuation
of the recruiting phase weakness, and their effectiveness in
establishing a CI Assistant POI which would prepare soldiers
for MOS tasks in tactical CI and OPSEC. Although the task
was complicated by problems external to USAICS, and the lack
of prior experience with 97B10 duty performance in the field
was present, USAICS designed implementation was effective.
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2 . Additional Formal Training Requirements
Soldiers successfully completing the probationary
period, and selected for training in 97B20 skills, will
again return to USAICS. This training will supplement pre-
vious training, and investigative and special operations
topics will be presented. As of the publication of this
thesis, the exact structure and content of this course is
under consideration. The first group of 97Bl0s eligible for
returning to USAICS will occur in March 1982. Those re-
turning for training will be 21 years of age, and have a
minimum of one year in a tactical unit. Upon completing the
course, the individuals will be issued a badge and creden-
tials, if duties require their use.
Currently, the planning for the course is based on
a modular approach of instruction. The basic premise for
this concept is the different experience and training
levels personnel reporting for the 97B20 course will have.
Some will arrive who are in-service recruits, and may have
two or more years of Army experience, but neither experience
nor training in 97B. The soldiers who have completed the
97B10 training will have varying degrees of Army experience,
and will have been trained in all but selected 97B topics.
However, as with any training, the retention level declines
over time, and some refresher training will be required.
The modular concept centers on offering the 97B20 course,
with in-service recruits completing the 18 week course, and
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97B10s entering the last eight weeks to receive refresher,
investigative and special operations training. Once the
individual completes the course, the MOS 97B20 will be
awarded.
E . SUMMARY
This chapter has presented the strengths and weaknesses
associated with the CI Assistant program in the recruiting
and formal training phases. Although the strengths and
weaknesses are implicitly tied to the model, the signifi-
cance lies in the processes and issues. The model is merely
a device to assist in the diagnosis. The recruitment prob-
lems of incorrect information and contracts have had an ad-
verse impact on the program, which carried over into the
formal training phase. Although the faculty was uncertain
of the tasks 97B10s would be performing in the field, the
POI developed and implemented has been effective in training
soldiers in tactical CI and OPSEC.
The diagnosis of the change process will continue in
Chapter V, emphasizing the actual employment of 97Bl0s in a
unit. As can be seen thus far, the implementation of the
program has had an impact on several aspects of the Army's
organization, and what could have been termed a minimal
change involving a structural adjustment and modification
of tasks has affected other areas as well.
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V. THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSISTANT IN THE MILITARY UNIT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides the diagnosis of CI Assistants in
tactical units. The role of 97B10s will be reviewed from
the soldiers
'
, supervisors ' and commanders ' perspectives
,
and compared with the intended use of 97B10s. The duties
accomplished and the performance of CI Assistants will also
be examined. The satisfaction of soldiers in accomplishing
their unit duties, and their retention potential, will cul-
minate the diagnosis of the program. Within this phase, the
model components that are affected include: a lack of com-
munication to units regarding the 97B10 program; a structural
deficiency that was initially identified, but was not acted
upon; and the commanders, supervisors and soldiers who are
charged with implementing the effective use of CI Assistants
within the tactical unit.
B. ROLE AND DUTIES PERFORMED
The first 97B10s arrived at their units beginning in May
1980. Upon their arrival, and to the publication of this
thesis, information provided to units concerning the 97B10
program has been minimal. The document units have in common
on the concept, training and duty restrictions of CI Assist-
ants is limited to the ACSIGRAM. As previously noted, this
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program does not represent a new technology. However, the
lack of information disseminated to units has created diffi-
culties. Unit supervisors were not aware of the training
97Bl0s had received, or the duties which they were capable
of performing. This led to an educational process consisting
of 97Bl0s explaining what they had been trained in and what
tasks they could accomplish. The uncertainty experienced by
supervisors caused them to feel frustrated, and unsure of
the manner in which to train and utilize CI Assistants.
This lack of information to units can be transformed into a
lack of expertise, and in the case of the CI Assistant pro-
gram, caused units to be at a distinct disadvantage in
managing 97B10s. A degree of resistance can be anticipated
with almost any change in an organization. However, in the
case of the CI Assistant program, the lack of information
given to units has compounded this resistance.
Supervisors surfaced one additional consideration which
appears to have contributed to resistance toward the pro-
gram. Although they considered the majority of soldiers
capable of performing as Assistants and having the potential
to become Agents, the unanimous opinion was that the screen-
ing process should be reestablished. It was felt this would
reduce the possibility of soldiers who are not qualified for
the 97B MOS from entering the field, prevent other methods




Although resistance to the program was noted, it was
based on a personal resistance, primarily in first line su-
pervisors. This resistance was based on the lack of infor-
mation concerning the program, a dislike for managing
junior enlisted personnel, being confronted with the duties
and problems associated with younger soldiers, and the fact
that the CI Assistants were allowed into the 97B field with-
out the requirements supervisors had to meet, e.g., screen-
ing, prior service, etc. Commanders were more positive
toward the program, and considered the action as a positive
step in improving the MOS. Although personal resistance was
observed, organizational resistance was not identified dur-
ing the course of the interviews.
The lack of information slowed the process of training
and employing CI Assistants, and because there was minimal
data available to units from higher headquarters, units
opened informal communication networks with adjacent units
and higher headquarters . Although informal networks with
similar units are not undesirable, the need to open these
channels further frustrated unit supervisors, who felt more
complete information should have been provided prior to the
arrival of CI Assistants.
In interviewing supervisors and commanders, the goal of
initiating the program was deduced from other sources of
information, but the intended employment and career progres-
sion were unclear. One of the basic concepts in the design
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of the program was that the 97B10 would work as a member of
a team with more experienced CI Agents. While the exact
status of all units is unknown, the units visited were criti-
cally short senior Agent personnel. In all three units, the
senior personnel were limited to platoon/section leaders and
sergeants. In these positions, their efforts were oriented
toward administrative and management duties rather than
operational CI duties. It was also noted that there was an
average of one senior enlisted Agent per ten CI Assistants.
Furthermore, in one unit there were no senior enlisted Agents
present as of September 1981. In another unit two senior
enlisted Agents were present, but one anticipated a perma-
nent change of station in the near future, leaving one 97B50
to supervise approximately 25 CI Assistants. The shortage
of senior Agents has resulted in minimal team training, and
has required 97B10s to become team leaders and perform some
of the duties of a CI Agent, such as conducting inspections
and surveys, rather than assisting in these tasks. Addi-
tionally, this shortage of senior Agents has resulted in
97B10s preparing and presenting unit MOS training where more
experienced personnel were anticipated.
Supervisors and commanders indicated that CI Assistants
had been well trained in tactical CI and OPSEC. Supervisors
did, however, indicate that more training was needed in
report writing and administrative duties such as typing, the
Army Functional File System, etc. The lack of initial
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information caused some consternation among supervisors as
to the direction unit training should take. Supervisors
indicated that training was oriented toward preparing sol-
diers for the next skill level, and continuing their educa-
tion in tactical CI and OPSEC. A shortage of training
materials for 97Bl0s has been experienced, in terms of a
soldier's manual and job books for CI Assistants. As of
the publication of this document, these items are still not
available in the field. The 97B10s also feel that this
training material shortage is a problem. Interviews with
soldiers and results from the questionnaire revealed that
52.7 per cent of the respondents considered the availability
of training materials in the unit fair to poor.
In conducting interviews with soldiers, supervisors, and
commanders, it was ascertained that the role CI Assistants
are playing in units is not as extensive as was initially
intended. Several factors enter into this consideration.
As previously noted, units receiving soldiers had little
prior knowledge of the program, or of the training soldiers
had received. This caused an unavoidable unit delay in im-
plementing training and employment programs until this in-
formation could be ascertained. The units visited have been
understrength for a continuing period of time. Therefore,
taskings were frequently beyond their capabilities. The
rapid growth experienced with the introduction of the CI
Assistants gave the gaining units expanded capabilities, but
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units requesting support were not fully aware that addi-
tional assets were available. Additionally, two units had
recently reorganized, resulting in a change of tasking pro-
cedures for CI support. During this transition process,
requests for CI support were minimal.
Operations Security programs in units supported by CI
units vary from extensive to minimal. This is attributed to
the degree of emphasis placed on OPSEC by unit commanders.
However, as the CI units gain experience in working with
97B10s, and fully develop internal training programs, the
realization that slack resources are available will permit
an increase in the amount of CI support that can be provided,
The current tasks performed by CI Assistants are in
keeping with the duties outlined in the regulation, although
due to the shortage of senior 97B personnel some functions
are being performed without close supervision. Even with
these additional duties, 97Bl0s are not being employed to
optimize their current or potential capabilities. Results
from the questionnaire revealed that the most frequent MOS
tasks performed were CI inspections, surveys and OPSEC.
However, according to 6 5 per cent of the respondents, the
majority of the duty day was spent accomplishing garrison
requirements, and MOS and common soldier skill training.
Responses to the questionnaire indicated 33.3 per cent train
one hour or less per week in MOS subjects, and 42.1 per cent
train between two and six hours per week. In conducting
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interviews with soldiers, this MOS related training was
adjudged as low quality, due to the lack of qualified senior
personnel and the fact that, due to other commitments, MOS
training was often attended by a minimal number of soldiers.
Some of the 97Bl0s have been attached to other sections
within units. Although these sections are performing func-
tions related to tactical CI and OPSEC, e.g., S2 staff,
OPSEC M & A section, the 97B10s are performing primarily
clerical duties. Only one unit that was observed is employ-
ing soldiers in this manner, but it is of interest that in
an evaluation of MOS 97B, 52 per cent of the potential
supervisors in tactical units indicated they would utilize
CI Assistants as clerks or motor pool maintenance personnel.
Forty-eight per cent of the INSCOM potential supervisors
indicated they would employ 97B10s as 97Ds or clerks/typists
[Ref. 21]. This attitude may be a result of the lack of
understanding concerning the CI Assistant program that
supervisors had at the time of the evaluation, or it could
relate to the unwillingness to consider the CI Assistant as
an important addition to the CI field based on the given
information. Respondents to the questionnaire indicated
that supervisors are now aware of the duties performed by
CI Assistants, and that supervisors consider the CI Assis-
tant to be an asset to the 97B field. Therefore, the use of
CI Assistants in the role of administrative specialists, or
as 97Ds, should diminish.
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The assignment of 97B10s to units was based on author-
ized 97B20 MTOE positions. A change to the MTOE structure
was to be made in March 1981, changing some positions to
97B10. Although the change was planned and instructions
were contained in Circular 611-82 (Personnel Selection and
Classification, Implementation of Change 15, AR 611-201) the
redesignation of positions did not occur. This has resulted
in the termination of the recruitment effort as of August
1981. The current intent is to begin recruitment in January
1982, after the MTOE changes have been made. This action
could be considered a delay in the program. It may, how-
ever, be advantageous to the implementation. The delay will
permit the recruiting program to become stabilized, and any
further problems with inaccurate information and enlistment
contracts should not be anticipated. Furthermore, units
were experiencing too rapid a growth. Classes were gradua-
ting with an average of 40 CI Assistants every two months.
Units which had been accustomed to operating with five
Agents were now gaining as many as three to five CI Assis-
tants with every graduating class. This not only created
logistics problems, but did not allow a gradual integra-
tion of newly acquired 97B10s, and kept units in a state of
flux. The delay in recruiting will permit units to normal-
ize operations, and perhaps determine future gains in order
to plan for the arrival of CI Assistants, rather than re-




Soldiers interviewed and respondents to the question-
naire were asked if they were satisfied with the MOS duties
they perform. Forty-seven per cent of the responses to the
questionnaire indicated they were not satisfied. In con-
ducting interviews, the primary reason for the lack of
satisfaction was the infrequency with which they performed
MOS related tasks, rather than a dislike for the tasks. As
previously noted, some units have not had sufficient time to
normalize operations since the rapid growth they have ex-
perienced with CI Assistants, and therefore they have not
extended to the optimum the CI support they are now capable
of providing. Furthermore, it was noted that opinions on
satisfaction were positively correlated on a unit basis. As
an example, one unit visited conducted less than two hours
of MOS training per week, and the CI support missions were
infrequent. Soldiers indicated they were extremely dis-
satisfied with the 97B10 MOS, because they spent the majority
of their time performing motor stables, fatigue details and
clerical support. Another unit visited also had infrequent
CI missions, but had initiated an intensive and aggressive
training program. Soldiers in this unit, although looking
forward to more mission tasking, were satisfied with the
MOS. Additionally, this unit had taken and was preparing
to undertake further measures to increase the amount of CI
support by informing units of their expanded capabilities.
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This indicates that the variable of management style can
play an important part in the overall satisfaction soldiers
experience in the MOS and the unit. The supervisors of
soldiers who were totally dissatisfied looked upon the 97B10s
as a source of manpower, and were not actively pursuing means
of improving their professional or personal development. By
contrast, the unit where satisfaction was noted was marked
by supervisors who displayed a genuine concern for the sol-
diers' professional and personal development. This certainly
is not a new discovery, but does reemphasize the importance
management style can play.
Soldiers interviewed indicated that nicknames had been
given to the 97B10s, such as "baby agents", "spooklets" or
"shadow agents". Soldiers in units where training and MOS
tasks were minimal, and which had the CI Assistants primarily
performing fatigue details, considered these nicknames as
derogatory. The use of such titles by supervisors was
viewed by soldiers as indicative of how the unit felt toward
the CI Assistants. Responses to the questionnaire revealed
that 21.1 per cent of the soldiers felt their supervisors
considered the MOS 97B10 as very unimportant or unimportant.
Again, this response can be associated with units having
marginal training programs and a low frequency of CI mis-
sions. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the 12 respond-
ents who indicated their supervisors do not consider the
97B10 MOS as an important addition to the CI field would
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come from two or three units, rather than twelve separate
units.
An additional factor which has adversely affected satis-
faction with the MOS is the recruitment difficulties en-
countered by most of the soldiers. Although soldiers in
units do not hold this as a primary reason for dissatisfac-
tion with the MOS, it has caused CI Assistants to be bitter.
Their initial expectations of becoming a CI Agent, and per-
forming the associated tasks, are now further away than when
they enlisted. For those who are 18 years of age, it has
meant that their plan of becoming an Agent in a non-tactical
unit will not be realized, unless they reenlist. This, com-
bined with the lack of training and low MOS task performance,
has caused some to be firmly committed to leaving the service
after their initial enlistment. Again, interviews with sol-
diers in units that were taking an aggressive approach to
training and increasing CI support indicated a more positive
outlook, and were either undecided or intended to reenlist.
D. RETENTION POTENTIAL
One of the major goals of the CI Assistant program was
to increase the active duty strength of junior CI personnel.
To this extent the program will increase the strength, how-
ever not by the numbers anticipated or desired. Currently,
24.6 per cent of the respondents to the questionnaire have
indicated they intend to reenlist for the 97B MOS. The
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overall Army reenlistment rate for the first nine months of
Fiscal Year 1980 for first term soldiers was 59.7 per cent.
Although an official goal has not been established for the
97B10 reenlistment rate, it was anticipated that approxi-
mately 50 per cent would reenlist.
In interviewing soldiers, the reasons for not reenlisting
included dissatisfaction with the MOS, with 21.1 per cent of
the respondents to the questionnaire providing this reason.
Others do not plan on reenlisting for other reasons, which
ranged from too many fatigue details to a dislike for the
Army way of life. Responses to the questionnaire revealed
12.3 per cent would not reenlist because of reasons other
than the MOS. An additional 10.5 per cent indicated they
intend to reenlist, however they currently plan to reenlist
for another MI or non-MI MOS
.
The largest category consists of those soldiers who are
currently undecided. Many variables enter into this deci-
sion process, but the more salient factors included were an
optimistic attitude that training and mission requirements
would improve; and that they will be allowed to return for
97B20 training when they become eligible. Because of the
problems encountered in the recruitment phase, soldiers are
somewhat skeptical that they will return to USAICS as
scheduled. Responses to the questionnaire indicated that




The low reenlistment intent of soldiers is again closely-
associated with unit programs and management techniques.
Interviews with soldiers in units with a weak training pro-
gram and low CI support requirements were more inclined to
not reenlist or to reenlist for another MOS . Units which
have taken positive action to develop a viable training pro-
gram and increase their CI support to tactical units are
identified with soldiers who intend to reenlist for their
current MOS or are undecided. Based on these findings, the
reenlistment rate can be improved. Although specific cost
data was not collected, it would appear that under the cur-
rent conditions the CI Assistant program is not cost effec-
tive. Even if 50 per cent of those currently undecided, or
indicating they will reenlist for another MOS, were to re-
main in the 97B field, the intended reenlistment rate would
be only 44.3 per cent.
E . SUMMARY
This chapter has provided strengths and weaknesses asso-
ciated with the role CI Assistants are filling in tactical
units, and the job satisfaction experienced by 97B10s. Al-
though the intended role of CI Assistants is being applied
as described in AR 611-201, the extent to which they are
being teamed with senior personnel, trained in MOS skills,
and performing tactical CI and OPSEC functions, is below the
anticipated level. This has resulted in 97B10s performing
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duties that have been interpreted by many CI Assistants as
"duty soldiers", and caused a lack of job satisfaction in
the MOS . This dissatisfaction in the MOS caused the inten-
tion for reenlistment to fall well below the Army's overall
first term enlistment rate.
The failure to apply a structural change to unit MTOE
positions for 97B10 has deferred futher recruitment of CI
Assistants until the adjustment has been made. This delay
in further recruitment should have a positive effect in
terms of allowing time for final correction of deficiencies
in the recruitment phase, and allow units to reach a steady
state in training and other programs. The reinstitution of
the recruitment effort should then allow units to accept CI
Assistants under more normalized conditions, and not present
an unexpected rapid growth.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The researcher considers the current state of the Coun-
terintelligence Assistant program to be ineffective. Al-
though the program was initially well designed and planned,
and the need for the program is vital to the 97B field, the
weaknesses identified in the implementation have offset the
original intent of the program. The intended change ap-
peared as a straightforward modification of CI tasks and
structure. However, as the implementation progressed, the
processes became more complex and affected other areas of
the Army's organization.
A change within a complex organization normally requires
a longer period of time than that associated with the CI
Assistant program. From the initial FORSCOM proposal to
revise the MOS in September 1978 until the active recruit-
ment for 97B10s began in May 1979, only eight months elapsed,
Within such a complex bureaucratic organization this is a
relatively short period of time. The eight months from pro-
posal to activation may not have allowed sufficient time for
all necessary objectives to be planned and accomplished cor-
rectly in achieving the ultimate goal. Indicators that this
may have been the case are the weaknesses in the recruitment
phase; the failure to adjust the screening process, causing
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it to be discontinued for 97B10; the early arrival of stu-
dents at USAICS, causing the initial class to be moved up
two months; the lack of information provided to units; and
the failure to submit MTOE changes on schedule, which re-
sulted in termination of the recruitment effort.
The arrival of 97B10s in tactical MI units, while ex-
pected, was not well publicized. Supervisors and commanders
who had little prior knowledge of the CI Assistant program
found the CI sections growing at a tremendous rate, some
over 400 per cent in slightly more than a year. This lack
of knowledge on the program, and unanticipated growth rate,
caused units to falter initially in developing training pro-
grams and employing CI Assistants. Prior to the 97B10s*
arrival in units, the majority of supervisors indicated they
would employ CI Assistants as 97Ds, maintenance personnel or
clerks. In some instances this philosophy has been followed,
a practice which is criticized by 97B10s. A shortage of
senior Agent personnel compounded the problem of developing
training programs and employing CI Assistants as intended.
This has resulted in 97B10s actually accomplishing tasks for
which they were intended to only provide assistance in com-
pleting, and therefore not gaining the experience they would
have received by observing and assisting the senior Agent
personnel. Additionally, the frequency of MOS training is
in some instances very low. Unit MOS training in skill
level one and two subject areas is frequently being conducted
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by 97Bl0s. The value of this training is questionable, as
the 97B10s have rarely accomplished the tasks they are
presenting.
Operations Security continues to represent a program
that has not yet expanded to its full potential. Although
programs exist in most units, the emphasis placed on OPSEC
by supported units, and the innovative methods developed by
CI units, vary. The previous shortage of CI assets, com-
bined with the growing stages, have not yet permitted the
utilization of slack resources to upgrade OPSEC programs
through aggressive and innovative approaches. The manage-
ment style of supervisors and commanders will play an in-
tegral part in this development. Units which have undertaken
positive action toward training and expanding CI tactical
and OPSEC support are associated with soldiers who are
satisfied with their job and are contemplating reenlistment
for the 97B MOS. Units that are not actively pursuing
training programs, and employ 97B10s primarily in roles as-
sociated with clerical support, maintenance and fatigue
details are marked with soldiers who are dissatisfied with
the unit and the MOS, and intend to reenlist for another
MOS, or do not plan to reenlist at all.
The intent for reenlistment is currently extremely low,
at 24.6 per cent. Although the intentions for reenlistment
may improve as the program reaches a steady state, some
factors which have contributed to this current trend are:
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the recruitment problems that caused the expectations of
soldiers to be deferred, for some as much as three years; a
skeptical view by soldiers that they will not be returned to
USAICS for skill level two training upon completion of the
probation period; the shortage of MOS training and perfor-
mance of CI related tasks, resulting in 97Bl0s accomplishing
duties they consider less than desirable. Unless these con-
ditions can be improved, it is doubtful that the reenlistment
rate will increase significantly.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
With the termination of the recruitment effort in August
1981, the identified problem in the recruiting phase should
be corrected. This will allow soldiers to be provided the
correct job description, and therefore no further complaints
of unfulfilled contracts should be anticipated. Additionally,
soldiers arriving at USAICS will be fully aware that they are
to be trained as CI Assistants, and will serve their initial
assignment in a tactical unit. This will alleviate the mis-
conceptions soldiers previously encountered upon their arri-
val at USAICS. The actions currently in progress at USAICS
to resolve the enlistment contract disputes, and the adverse
impact this has had on the morale of soldiers attending the
97B10 course, should abate during this period. This will




According to soldiers, supervisors, commanders, and the
observations of the researcher, USAICS is providing instruc-
tion of excellent quality which is preparing soldiers for
tasks related to tactical CI and OPSEC. The initial knowl-
edge possessed by USAICS of the tasks 97B10s would perform
in units was limited, and the uncertainty they conveyed to
students in this area was understandable. However, as the
program continues, further studies and field evaluations by
USAICS can improve their knowledge of tasks accomplished in
units, and identify areas that will require further instruc-
tion. This will allow USAICS faculty and staff to indicate
more positively to students the various types of duties they
will perform, and facilitate modification of the existing
POI to meet unit needs.
Although the program is nearing steady state in units,
additional information would be beneficial in topics such as
training received, reiteration of the intended employment,
the rate units can anticipate CI Assistant gains, and the
specific procedures that will be followed in returning CI
Assistants to USAICS for accreditation as Agents. This in-
formation would assist units in planning for the CI Assis-
tant 1 s arrival and eliminate the skepticism currently
experienced by soldiers in the field.
The risk of allowing an individual to have access to
sensitive information as an Agent when the individual's
loyalty, integrity, discretion and/or character are unsuited
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for such duties should be reduced by the continuation of the
requirement for eligibility to access to SCI. The effects
that the termination of the screening process have had on
the 97B field will require further research.
Perhaps the most difficult, and yet most critical, phase
of the program requiring attention is the CI Assistant in
the field. Without question, the contributions of the CI
Assistant can improve the survivability of units on the
modern battlefield. Units receiving CI support must be made
aware of the threat they will face, and the appropriate
measures to counter this threat. This will require an in-
tensive effort to provide information to all commanders re-
garding the criticality of CI support, and how it can
increase a unit's effectiveness. Commanders who are unaware
of or elect not to use available CI resources are forgoing
a valuable asset designed to complement their efforts in
accomplishing their combat mission. Perhaps the most effec-
tive means of disseminating this information is through
direct contact with commanders and supervisors of CI per-
sonnel. However, prior to this action commanders and super-
visors of CI personnel must insure that training programs
have been developed that not only maintain, but increase,
the level of competence and expertise of CI personnel.
Furthermore, innovation is needed in developing OPSEC pro-
grams that will insure optimal support is rendered. Com-
manders who fail to recognize the importance of tactical CI
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and OPSEC, and the important role CI Assistants can play in
this area, are doing a disservice to the soldier, the sup-




INTERVIEW AND QUESTIONNAIRE METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
This appendix provides the methodology employed in con-
ducting interviews and designing, administering and receiving
feedback from the questionnaire. Furthermore, identified
strengths and weaknesses of the interview techniques used
and questionnaire design are provided, followed by recom-
mendations for consideration should a similar study be con-
ducted at a future date.
INTERVIEWS
The decision to use interviews conducted with soldiers,
supervisors and commanders as the primary source of data was
made at the onset of thesis research, in April 1981. Inter-
viewing allowed direct two-way communication, permitted
clarification of questions and responses, and gained addi-
tional data which might not have otherwise been discovered.
A bottom-up approach was followed in each unit by initially
interviewing soldiers, followed by immediate supervisors,
and then commanders. When designing the interview questions,
the researcher incorporated prior interview experience ob-
tained while accomplishing duties in the Military Intelli-
gence field, knowledge gained from courses at the Naval
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Postgraduate School, and information obtained from existing
publications. Questions were open-ended, and sought to
gain individual thoughts and opinions on the CI Assistant
program. Questions were limited in number to allow for
expansion in selected areas, or the addition of other topics
of interest.
The number of personnel to be interviewed was based on
the availability of soldiers present for duty in the unit on
the days the researcher would be present on the installation.
In conducting the interviews the first objective was to place
the respondent at ease and create an atmosphere conducive to
two-way communication. Initially, a one-on-one interview was
attempted, but respondents appeared uneasy in this situation.
After the same occurrence with a two-on-one session, the
number of personnel was increased to four. This method was
effective, and created an environment which led to a free
exchange of thoughts and comments. Additionally, this pro-
cedure assisted some less verbal individuals who would not
have been as likely to provide information in a one-on-one
session. One group interviewed consisted of 24 personnel,
which was too large a number for a single session. Person-
nel felt free to provide their opinions, but discussion
often overlapped. This required stopping for clarification
on several occasions. Additionally, when a particularly
sensitive subject was surfaced by one of the respondents,
the remainder of the group was affected, and the tendency
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was to band together in selected topical areas. This peer
pressure was not experienced in the smaller groups.
A total of 43 soldiers, supervisors and commanders were
personally interviewed at three installations. The selection
of the three installations was based on the different types
of units provided CI support (Airborne, Armored and Infan-
try) , and the high density of 97B10s at these installations.
Additionally, 34 students, staff and faculty members were
interviewed at USAICS. Personal interviews were also con-
ducted with two station recruiters in the Western Region,
and two AFEES guidance counselors in the Midwestern Region.
Additionally, telephonic interviews were conducted with
station recruiters, and personnel at a District Recruiting
Command headquarters; Headquarters, USAREC; Headquarters,
TRADOC; Headquarters, FORSCOM; and DA agencies and staffs.
QUESTIONNAIRE
The decision to administer a questionnaire as a supple-
ment to data obtained from soldier interviews was made on
3 May 1981. The intent of developing and administering a
questionnaire was not for the expressed purpose of providing
a lengthy statistical analysis, but to gain data from sol-
diers in several unit locations in the United States and
overseas areas. Although the number of soldiers interviewed
does represent a significant number, since 31 of a possible
94, or 32.9 per cent of all 97B10s, were interviewed, this
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represents only three unit programs. The use of a question-
naire allowed for a minimum of 21 unit inputs on a worldwide
basis, and therefore a more comprehensive review of the
program. To elicit frank and open responses, personnel sent
a questionnaire or interviewed were granted confidentiality.
Research and development of the questionnaire was ac-
complished from 8 May through 12 July 1981. Selected docu-
ments were reviewed, which provided information on preparation
and design of questions, and several previous surveys were
reviewed for question structure and format. The finalized
question design, content and format were verified with a
document which provided a comprehensive overview of question-
naire design [Ref . 22] . Five areas were selected for inclu-
sion in the questionnaire. These areas were: demographic
data, recruitment information, formal training received at
USAICS, duty performance and job satisfaction, and retention
potential in 97B. The last item of the questionnaire allowed
soldiers to enter any comments concerning the 97B10 MOS
.
Questions were developed specifically for the CI Assistant
program, and permitted respondents to select a prepared
answer or, in several instances, enter a written response
of their own selection. The length of the questionnaire was
held to less than 50 questions to enhance the possible num-
ber of responses. The researcher hypothesized that a lengthy
questionnaire might have a chilling effect on the respond-
ents, and thus be discarded as too time-consuming. This
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was of particular concern in view of the several open-ended
questions and item 49, which allowed additional comments.
Although some questions were based on a Likert scale, open-
ended questions were considered a viable means of allowing
personnel to provide responses specific to their unit, and
to give an insight into their thoughts and opinions.
Two interviews were conducted with CI Assistants prior
to designing the questionnaire in order to obtain insight
into the processes of the program and insure that correct
terminology was used. This information, combined with data
collected from agencies and staffs within DA, provided the
basis for selecting the areas and substance of the question-
naire. Throughout the process of writing the questionnaire,
the researcher collaborated with a Naval Postgraduate School
Professor recognized as an authority in questionnaire de-
velopment and design. The final draft was completed on 23
July 1981, and was prepared in final form on 31 July 1981.
The sample size consisted of the entire population of CI
Assistants assigned to units as of 31 July 1981. Assignment
addresses were obtained for graduates of the 97B10 course,
as well as those 97B10s who attended the CI Agent course
prior to the implementation of the CI Assistant course. This
process involved obtaining copies of class rosters and con-
ducting an audit to identify personnel who had successfully
completed the course. After personnel who had been elimi-
nated from the Army, reclassified into another MOS , recycled
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into a later 97B10 course, or were on casual duty pending
assignment were identified, 94 personnel remained as possi-
ble respondents. It was because of the relatively small
number of personnel in the field that the entire population
was included. Assignment orders with applicable amendments
were obtained, and in some instances the world-wide locator
was used to identify pinpoint assignments. The distribution
of the questionnaire is shown in Figure 4. All question-
naires were mailed on 3 August 1981.
The responses to the questionnaire began arriving 10
August 1981. Six questionnaires of personnel who could not
be located were returned through postal channels, and these
were discarded in computing the percentage of return. There-
fore, 88 personnel could have responded to the questionnaire
A total of 57 responses were received, or 64.8 per cent
(Figure 5) . This is sufficient return to consider the ques-
tionnaire results valid. However, due to the small sample
size, statistical analysis or inference must be used with
caution. As an example, if the sample size were 100, and
the observed responses were 50 per cent for an issue and
50 per cent against the issue, the statistical reliability
at the 9 5 per cent level of confidence would be ±10.8 [Ref.
23: p. 192]. As can be seen, the sampling error is rela-
tively large for a sample size of 100 or smaller. Addi-
tionally, it should be noted that 30 of the respondents had
been assigned to their units for only one to two months.
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There is an adjustment period for soldiers when they are
joining the unit's workforce, learning the norms of their
new culture, and identifying which tasks and functions they
are expected to perform. Therefore, their opportunities
to participate in MOS related tasks and their knowledge of
unit programs is justifiably limited during this period.
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
Interviews and questionnaires each have distinct advan-
tages and disadvantages. Interviews permit two-way communi-
cation, clarification of questions and responses, expansion
of information, development of new areas of information and
the opportunity to observe non-verbal communications. How-
ever, interviews are resource sensitive and, dependent upon
the constraints that may exist, frequently only a limited
data base can be obtained. Additionally, quantitative analy-
sis of interview responses is more difficult, and requires
an unbiased, subjective approach to insure that valid analy-
sis occurs. A questionnaire is not as resource sensitive,
and permits a larger contingent to provide data. Addition-
ally, a questionnaire is more conducive to quantitative
analysis. The disadvantages of a questionnaire include a
lack of direct communication, inadvertent or intentional
failure of respondents to reply to part or all of the ques-
tions, and the possibility that questions requiring further
clarity are contained in the questionnaire. A degree of
85

uncertainty exists in insuring that respondents receive the
questionnaire, particularly when variables such as reassign-
ment, extended field exercises, leaves, temporary duties,
and addresses to replacement companies and detachments are
considered. The possibility also exists that a critical
question or area may be undiscovered in a questionnaire,
even though the opportunity to express relevent comments may
be provided. Specific strengths and weaknesses associated
with the interviews conducted and the questionnaire will be
discussed in turn.
The interview methodology and techniques previously dis-
cussed were effective, with conducting a session with a large
group the only weakness noted, as pointed out earlier. The
questionnaire design, content, and format were effective in
supplementing interview data. The use of open-ended ques-
tions permitted personnel to include responses unique to
their unit, and allowed individuals to express personal views
in a reasonable manner. Of the 57 responses, 38 contained
additional comments in the last item of the questionnaire.
These comments ranged in length from a few sentences to
several pages, and provided valuable insight into the 97B10
program as seen from the soldier's viewpoint. However, one
of the weaknesses of open-ended questions, that of respond-
ents failing to provide a response, was experienced. Ques-
tions 24 and 32 provided no possible responses which could
be selected, but required a written answer. Twenty-seven
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personnel elected not to respond to question 24 (47.4 per
cent) , and 37 did not respond to question 32 (64.9 per cent)
.
Feedback received from personnel interviewed indicated
that the questionnaire length, content and clarity were
satisfactory. However, two questions were identified by
some soldiers as lacking clarity. Question 26 requested the
level of assignment and provided five possible choices : Com-
bat Arms Division or Brigade, MI Group, MI Battalion, MI
Company or Other. The point made, and well taken, was that
if an individual was assigned to an MI Company which is
subordinate to an MI Battalion, two possible choices would
be correct. Question 40 requested soldiers to indicate if
the training they had received prepared them beyond, exactly
at, or below a level needed to accomplish tasks they perform
in their MOS. The intent was unclear to some respondents,
and both questions can be rectified by restructuring the
questions.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are provided should a fu-
ture study of a similar nature be considered. The number of
CI Assistants in the field will unquestionably continue to
grow. This will provide a larger and more experienced sam-
ple size, and when coupled with the absence of sufficient
resources may warrant total reliance on a questionnaire.
Four factors should be considered for modification of the
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questionnaire design. Since a larger population will exist,
a random sample may be polled rather than using the entire
population. A larger sample size may also necessitate that
the researcher reduce or eliminate open-ended questions and
increase the emphasis on questions which have forced choice
or Likert scale responses. This will reduce the manual
manipulation and coding of data required in open-ended ques-
tions. Additionally, some questions or complete areas, such
as recruitment, may be deleted as the 97B10 program reaches
the steady state. More emphasis can then be placed on other
areas, such as utilization and performance. As a final con-
sideration, it is recommended that the questionnaire be ad-
ministered to a small test group, to eliminate vague or
ambiguous questions prior to distribution.
If possible, interviews with soldiers, supervisors and
commanders should be conducted to provide a more comprehen-
sive study. It would be desirable to conduct interviews at
several locations in the United States and overseas. How-
ever, in the absence of sufficient resources, questionnaires
for soldiers, supervisors and/or commanders may be the sole













Fort Benning, GA 1
Fort Bliss, TX 1
*Fort Bragg, NC 18
Fort Campbell, KY 2 1
Fort Carson, CO 5 1
*Fort Hood, TX 9 4
*Fort Huachuca, AZ 2
Fort Knox, KY 1
Fort Lewis, WA 6 2
*Fort Ord, CA 7 1
Fort Polk, LA 3
Fort Riley, KA 1 2
Fort Stewart, GA 2 2
Subtotal 69 25
Total Questionnaires Distributed 94
*Interviews were conducted at these installations





















































This appendix provides a copy of the questionnaire ad-
ministered to 97B10s, information on coding data for use
with the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)
,
and frequencies and histograms from the questionnaire re-
sults. The strengths and weaknesses of the questionnaire
were provided in Appendix A. Therefore, only the recommen-
dations and considerations for coding and inputting data
into the computer system are presented in this appendix. A
copy of the questionnaire immediately precedes the data
presentation, and includes the cover letter which provided




The questionnaire was coded for use with the SPSS, after
a front-end assessment was completed. This assessment was
accomplished during the design phase of the questionnaire,
and concentrated on insuring that forced choices were uni-
formly arranged. As an example, a question with choices of
strongly agree to strongly disagree was prepared so that
strongly agree was always the most positive choice. This
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procedure reduces coding time, and data can be presented
more effectively when choices are arranged in a uniform man-
ner. Open-ended questions are easily coded. However, as
the program develops, the possible responses to these ques-
tions will increase, and may require extensive manual manipu-
lation. This, combined with the drawbacks noted in Appendix
A, may further justify the elimination of open-ended ques-
tions in a larger sample.
The questionnaire required alphanumeric or written
responses. These responses were then transformed into nu-
merics for SPSS input. The advantage of this method is a
more manageable process for coding data, and a reduced card
case load, since each questionnaire required only one card.
Additionally, the responses were represented by one digit,
also a contributing factor to the use of one card per case.
Two or more numerics can be used; however, caution must be
exercised in the format statement and in coding the data to
insure that each response is properly represented by the
appropriate number of digits. All missing values were as-
signed a zero. Missing values indicate that an answer was
not provided by the respondent.
In determining the variable and value labels, a front-
end assessment can again be of benefit. The SPSS permits
only 40 characters per variable label, and 16 characters per
value label. These labels can be printed on the SPSS output
and, if selected judiciously, can provide a descriptive title
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for the printed data. This increases the readability, and
improves understanding by the user. Additional considera-
tions applied in coding the data and selecting the variables
and value labels included a complete double check of the
input data for accuracy, and a review of the labels by a
disinterested party to insure descriptive titles were used.
Two questions from the questionnaire are provided in
Figure 6 , to depict the coding methodology used to input
data for both a forced choice and an open-ended question.
The value labels limitations imposed by SPSS required two
titles to be used that might not be considered standard
abbreviations. An explanation of these two titles is pro-
vided for clarity. Question 8 contains the short title
"USAICS AND TRANS" on the SPSS histogram. This refers to a
soldier who was attending another MI course at USAICS and,
for reasons not stated, transferred into the 97B10 MOS.
Question 36 uses the abbreviation "SOLD" on the SPSS histo-
gram, which refers to basic soldier skill training. All
other value labels are considered adequate for interpretation
As previously noted, the entire population was included
in the questionnaire distribution. Therefore, the mean and
standard deviation represent a population mean and standard
deviation, not a sample mean and standard deviation. Tests
for significance are strictly applicable only for making
inferences from sample data to conditions existing in a
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larger population, and these tests are not appropriate when
the entire population is considered [Ref. 24: p. 234].
Therefore, statistical tests were suppressed from the data
output. If a question contains a choice that was not se-
lected by any of the respondents, the SPSS will not include
the choice on the histogram. A choice missing from a histo-




Question 26. I am currently assigned to a position in a
unit that can best be described as:
*1 = a. A Combat Arms Division or Brigade
2 = b. A Military Intelligence Group
3 = c. A Military Intelligence Battalion
4 = d. A Military Intelligence Company
e. Other (please specify)
(Soldiers provided the following written
responses to this question.)
5 = Military Assistance Center
6 = Corps Headquarters
Question 45. I am well satisfied with the geographic loca-
tion of my unit.
*1 = a. Strongly agree
2 = b. Agree
3 = c. No opinion
4 = d. Disagree
5 = e. Strongly disagree
Numeric values were assigned to the responses as shown.
Each question required one numeric value for SPSS input,
and the values were placed in card columns 1 through 49
for each case.





MONTEREY. CALIFORNIA - 93940
, N „ePLV BErEW TO
NC 4(54Cf)/mgk
Department of Administrative Science 31 July 1981
The purpose of this letter is to request your assistance in a research
project concerning the 97B10 Military Occupational Speciality (MOS) . An Army
officer is assisting me in this study of the recruitment, training and job
utilization of Counterintelligence Assistants. The enclosed questions are
being sent to all 97B10s in the field who have completed either the 97B10 or 20
course of instruction.
The enclosed questions ask for general and specific information concerning
the MOS. Your individual responses will be held in the strictest confidence
and will not be released. Only unidentified group information will be used in
this study. The questions should take approximately fifteen minutes to answer.
A self addressed envelope lias been enclosed for returning the questions.
Your answers will provide invaluable data concerning the implementation of
the 97B10 MOS within the Military Intelligence field. Because the success of
this research effort will naturally depend upon your response, your cooperation













INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THIS INFORMATION DOCUMENT.
1. Read each question carefully and select one response. Circle your choice,
or if you select a response requiring a written answer, place the information
in the space provided. Please print your written responses.
2. The last question on this document provides you an opportunity to express
any views or comments you consider relevant. Should you elect to complete
this question, please print or write legibly to ensure your response is taken
into consideration.
*****
1. My age on my last birthday was years. (enter age)
2. My sex is:
a. Male
b. Female
3. My current education level is:
a. High school graduate or GED
b. Some college or technical school
c. Technical school degree or certificate
d. Bachelors degree (BA or BS)
e. Bachelors degree plus some graduate work
f. Masters degree
g. Other (please specify)
4. I have been assigned to my current unit months. (enter months)






d. More than two
6. Have you ever served in the Armed Forces prior to your current enlistment?
a. Yes
b. No
7. If you answered question 6 no, please go to question 8. If you answered
question 6 yes, please provide your previous Military Occupational Speciality
(MOS)
,
years of service and the number of years you had a break in service.
MOS, i.e., 11B10, 63C20, etc.
Duty title
Years of prior service
Number of years break in service
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8. How did you first hear about Che MOS 97B10?
a. The local station recruiter provided information on the MOS
b. The counselor at Che Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station
(AFEES) provided Che informacion
c. I heard about the MOS from a friend
d. Other (please specify)
9. I enlisted in the Army at the AFEES in
(please indicate the ciCy and state)
10. The information provided by recruiter personnel regarding the duties I




d. I cannot recall
11. How was the information about the 97B10 MOS presented Co you?
a. PresenCed verbally only
b. PresenCed verbally, and I read Che job descripcion in an Army
RegulaCion
c. PresenCed verbally, and I read Che job descripcion from a pamphleC or
other documenc
d. I read an Army RegulaCion only
e. I read a pamphleC or other document only
f. Other (please specify)
12. My enlistment contract for 97B10 was:
a. Completely accurace
b. Inaccurace: indicaced 97B10, but the job title was Counterintelligence
Agent
c. Contained other errors
(please specify)
13. I was informed by recruiter personnel that I would be assigned to:
a. A tactical unit, Corps level or below
b. A non-tactical unit
c. A civilian clothes assignment as a Counterintelligence Agent
d. I was not informed of possible assignments
14. The main reason I enlisted in the Army was:
a. To gain job securiCy
b. To have job sac is face ion
c. To gain educational benefits





15. I selected Che MOS 97B10 because:
a. The job description sounded interesting
b. I plan to use my military training and experience to gain a civilian
job
c. Of the choices T had, the 97B10 MOS was the best available
d. Other (please specify)
16. I feel recruiter personnel provided me with information on the MOS 97BL0
to the best of their ability and understanding, based on the information they






17. Upon my arrival at the United States Army Intelligence Center and School
(USAICS) at Fort Huachuca:
a. I entered the 97B10 course to be trained as a Counterintelligence
Assistant as stated in my enlistment contract
b. I was informed that my enlistment contract was incorrect and I signed
a waiver to the contract prior to completion of the 97B10 course
c. I was informed that my enlistment contract was incorrect, and I took
action to have my enlistment contract invalidated, but later signed a
waiver to complete the 97BIO course
d. I was informed that my enlistment contract was incorrect, and attempted
to be reclassified into another MOS, but later signed a waiver to
complete the 97B10 course
e. Other (please specify)
18. The MOS course of instruction I attended at USAICS is best described as:
a. I attended a 97B10 course
b. I initially attended a 97B20 course, but was recycled to a 97B10
course
c. I initially attended a 97B10 course, and was recycled to another
97B10 course
d. I attended a 97B20 course
e. Other (please specify)
19. The job description for 97B10 provided by the USAICS personnel was:
a. In complete agreement with the job description given by recruiters
b. In partial agreement with the job description given by recruiters
c. Completely different than the job description given by recruiters




20. The personnel at USATCS were very knowledgeable about the tasks 1 would be






21. The training I received at the 97BL0 course prepared me for the duties I
am performing in my unit:
a. Satisfactorily
b. Marginally satisfactorily
c. Less than satisfactorily
d. Unsatisfactorily
22. The 97B10 course prepared me best for tasks related to:
a. Enemy intelligence collection assets
b. Operations Security support
c. Counterintelligence inspections and surveys
d. Preparation of reports and summaries
e. Other (please specify)






24. If I could change one area in the 97G10 course of instruction, the change
would be: (please specify)
25. I am currently serving in a:
a. 97B position
b. A Military Intelligence MOS, but not a 97B position
c. A position that is not a Military Intelligence MOS
26. I am currently assigned to a position in a unit that can best be described
as:
a. A Combat Arms Division or Brigade
b. A Military Intelligence Croup
c. A Military Intelligence Battalion
d. A Military Intelligence Company




27. The majority of my duty day is spent accomplishing:
a. Operations Security support
h. Counterintelligence inspections and surveys
c. Training in MOS and basic soldier skills within the unit
d. Daily garrison requirements
c. Other (please specify)
28. When I arrived at my present unit, my duties as a 97B10 were completely






29. My supervisors have a complete understanding of the duties of a 97B10, and






30. The intelligence duties and tasks I have performed most frequently in my
unit are best described as:
a. Counterintelligence inspections and surveys
b. Operations Security support
c. Intelligence training for other units
d. Other (please specify)
31. To what extent do you feel the tasks you are performing in your present






32. What task areas of your present job were not covered in the 97B10 course?
33. How important do you feel your supervisors believe your job is to the









34. In regard Co Che Casks I am performing as a 97B10, I find that I am












36'. The training I have received at my unit is:
a. Related to MOS tasks only
b. Related to common soldier skills only
c. A balance between MOS and common soldier skills
d. [ have received minimal training in MOS or common soldier skills







38. The average number of hours I spend each week participating in scheduled
unit MOS training is:
a. to 1
b. 2 to 6
c. 7 to 11
d. 12 to 16
c. Over 16










40. The MOS related Casks I am required to perform in my unit are best
described as:
a. Exactly what I was trained for at the 97B10 course
b. Beyond the training I received at the 97B10 course
c. Below the training I received at the 97E10 course
d. Other (please specify)
41. I have received follow-up information and clarification on the duties and





42. My supervisors have explained the career opportunities available to me,
and the additional schools I am eligible for at all skill levels of the 97B MOS,
a. Agree
b. Only the career opportunities were discussed
c. Only the schools I am eligible for were discussed
d. Only the next skill level career opportunities and schools were
discussed
e. Other (please specify)
43. I feel the personnel in the unit who are senior 97Bs, but art" not my
supervisors, (i.e., co-workers) consider the MOS 97310 as:
a. An important addition to the 97B field
b. Unimportant in the 97B field
c. No opinion
d. Other (please specify)





















47. If I could make Che: choice again, I would:
a. Enlist for my current MOS
b. Enlist for another Military Intelligence MOS




c. Other (please specify)
48. When my current enlistment is completed, [ plan to:
a. Reenlist for my current MOS
b. Reenlist for a non-Military Intelligence MOS
c. Not reenlist because of dissatisfaction with my MOS
d. Not reenlist because of other reasons
e. Other (please specify)
49. This space is reserved for any comments you may want to make concerning
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